Why HARM the subprime borrower? by Rajdeep Sengupta & Yu Man Tam
T
he hybrid adjustable rate mortgage 
or hybrid ARM (prophetically, the 
acronym is HARM) was the most common 
subprime mortgage product.  Hybrid-ARM 
products were specialized products that 
included an initial period over which the 
repayment schedule on the mortgage resem-
bled that of a fixed rate mortgage (FRM) and 
a subsequent period over which the payment 
schedule resembled an ARM.
1  The tempo-
rary introductory teaser rate was kept lower, 
arguably, to make the product attractive to 
the subprime borrower.  The date at which 
the payments reset into an indexed rate (for 
example, LIBOR plus 6 percent) was typi-
cally two or three years after the closing date 
on the mortgage.
2  What was the rationale 
behind such a unique design on subprime 
products?  Did this unique design have a 
role to play in the subsequent collapse of  
this market?
Why Hybrid ARM?
First, subprime borrowers were typically 
those who had impaired or incomplete 
credit histories.  Because of their higher risk 
of default, subprime borrowers were charged 
higher interest rates than conventional or 
prime borrowers on all kinds of loans.  For 
example, the interest rates on subprime auto 
loans were about 25-30 percent on average, 
studies have shown.
3  If the interest rate on 
subprime mortgages had been set to price 
the risk as was done on subprime auto loans, 
it was unlikely that the mortgages could 
have been afforded by subprime borrowers.   
This is because mortgage obligations are 
significantly higher than payments on 
other forms of consumer debt, including 
auto loans.  The hybrid-ARM product was 
conceived to enable subprime borrowers to 
obtain mortgages at affordable rates.
4
It was believed that this could be achieved 
through the appreciation in house prices.  
Economist Gary Gorton argued in a paper 
in 2008 that the mortgage design sought to 
benefit from house price appreciation over 
short horizons.  All else equal, borrowers 
could build up equity in their homes in a 
period of rising house prices and, in the 
eyes of the lender, become less of a risk on 
subsequent mortgages.  This allowed them 
to refinance at a lower rate (on the subse-
quent mortgage), which also reduced their 
likelihood of default.  In essence, house price 
appreciation was critical to the viability of the 
hybrid-ARM design.  Therefore, the hybrid 
ARM product allowed payments at the teaser 
rate essentially to help the borrower build 
up equity, but once the loan reset into the 
indexed rate, payment obligations increased.  
This was done to reduce the lenders’ exposure 
to a high-risk borrower over a long horizon 
and essentially force a refinancing of the 
mortgage.  The borrower was prevented from 
refinancing early by including a penalty for 
prepayment on the mortgage.
In a recent paper, economists Geetesh 
Bhardwaj and Rajdeep Sengupta point to 
some lesser known facts about subprime 
mortgages in general.
5  First, over 70 percent 
of subprime originations for each year 
(2000-2007) were originated as refinances.  
Second, a significant majority of these 
originations were hybrid-ARM products 
designed to reset into a fully indexed rate 
after two or three years.  Significantly, this 
reset was designed to be a step up (but 
hardly ever a step down), so as to increase 
the payment burden and essentially force a 
refinancing of the loan.  Third, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, teaser rates on hybrid 
ARMs were not low and not significantly 
different from those on closing rates on 
subprime FRMs.  Fourth, most subprime 
originations included prepayment penal-
ties with the prepayment term expiring no 
sooner than the reset date on the ARM.  
This meant that for hybrid-ARM products, 
the contract ensured that the penalty would 
be in effect at least as long as the borrower 
was required to pay the teaser rate.  In short, 
the mortgage was designed to ensure that 
subprime borrowers continued to make 
monthly payments at the closing rates before 
they could refinance into another mortgage.
Repayment Behavior  
on Subprime Mortgages
In terms of actual repayment behavior, 
the most important aspect of subprime loan 
performance was the high rates of early 
prepayments on the loan.  A loan is said to 
be prepaid when it is either refinanced into 
another mortgage or the property is sold off.  
This is hardly surprising because refinancing 
was an integral part of the mortgage design.
A noteworthy observation here is that low 
interest rates were not always the motiva-
tion behind prepayments (refinances) in the 
subprime market.  The notable examples 
here were hybrid-ARM products originated 
in 2003, a year of historically low interest  
rates.  Interestingly, in all the years these 
products were in existence, subprime origi- 
nations from 2003 showed the lowest default  
rates.  However, the principal reason for the 
remarkable performance of 2003 origina-
tions was high and early refinances.
6  Indeed, 
almost 83 percent of hybrid-ARM subprime 
products originated in 2003 were refinanced 
by the end of 2006.  The corresponding per-
centage for FRMs was 63 percent.  Signifi-
cantly, the fact that mortgages originated 
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1   During the fixed leg of the hybrid ARM, the 
mortgagee pays a lower introductory closing 
rate called the teaser rate.  The teaser rate 
remains in effect until the reset date, after 
which the repayment schedule on the hybrid 
ARM resembles an ARM.  The reset date, 
market index rate used and the margin are 
decided at the closing date.
2   These mortgages are also called the 2/28 
(two-year teaser rate followed by a 28-year 
ARM) and a 3/27 (three-year teaser rate  
followed by a 27-year ARM) respectively.
3   See Adams, Einav and Levin. 
4   See Gorton.
5   See Bhardwaj and Sengupta.
6   See Bhardwaj and Sengupta.
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during the low-interest-rate environment 
around 2003-2004 and refinanced in a 
high-rate environment in subsequent years 
indicates that lower rates were hardly the 
motivation behind subprime refinances.  
While we don’t know for sure what the 
motivation was, the most plausible explana-
tion would be to extract home equity.
Why Did the Subprime Market Collapse?
The important thing to remember is that 
a borrower on the brink of default has an 
exit option: prepay the mortgage either by 
refinancing or selling the property.  Interest-
ingly, Bhardwaj and Sengupta found that 
the total proportion of loans that either 
went into default or were prepaid remained 
unchanged across all vintages.  More impor-
tant, there was a significantly high incidence 
of early prepayments on subprime origina-
tions of earlier vintages.  However, this was 
followed by a sharp drop in prepayment rates 
after 2006, suggesting that fewer borrowers 
could use the prepayment exit option. 
Why did prepayments decline for origi-
nations of later vintages?  Herein lay the 
importance of the subprime mortgage 
design.  Prepayments (either in the form of 
refinances or an outright sale of the prop-
erty) were critical to the sustainability of 
subprime mortgages.  In a regime of rising 
house prices, borrowers could avoid default 
by prepaying their loans (either through a 
refinance or a property sale).  Moreover, if 
the house price appreciation was sufficiently 
large, a borrower could recover the costs 
of refinancing and even choose to extract 
equity.  However, this option was no longer 
available when prices did not appreciate.  
Consequently, borrower defaults began to 
increase sharply in 2006, when house prices 
ceased to appreciate.  
Rajdeep Sengupta is an economist and Yu Man 
Tam is a senior research associate at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  See http://research.
stlouisfed.org/econ/sengupta/ for more on 
Sengupta’s work.
This is in response to “Inflation May Be the Next 
Dragon To Slay,” an article that appeared in the 
January 2010 issue of The Regional Economist.  




I would like to thank the researcher for 
clearly explaining the predicament that those in 
charge of the Fed will likely to be facing.  There 
is so much currency in the system, and the 
Fed continues to debase the dollar by printing 
money by the trillion.  Where will it end?  Does 
the American public realize the government 
isn’t a separate entity but an extension of 
themselves?  YOU the Americans will have to 
pay all the trillions in debt that the government 
is taking on.  And your standard of living, based 
on debt and spending, cannot go on forever.  It 
appears as though the high-octane lifestyle is 
almost at an end.  Unusually, l found this article 
through the St. Louis Fed Reserve web site, 
which is interesting in itself because usually 
those who let the cat out of the bag, as it were, 
are most likely to conceal it.  On the same 
page, a poll is being carried out about inflation.  
Currently, 812 people have taken the poll and 
61 percent believe that inflation is “dead in the 
water.”  The dangers of such massive injections 
into the currency supply are being aired with 
increased vigor by many except the popular 
press.  Unfortunately, the masses will not read 
the said article or know how to insulate them-
selves from the pain associated with high  
levels of inflation.  I hope the problems do  
not come to light, but I bought 7 kg of silver 
today because l am betting that they do.  Does 
anyone have a time frame to said inflation?   
I am guessing 2-3 years, but would welcome 
comments.  Search for Bob Chapman.  He 
constantly talks about said problems.
John Kitcher, English teacher in elementary 
school in Seoul, South Korea
Go to http://stlouisfed.org/ExternalCFForms/
EditorLetterEnt.cfm to submit a letter electroni-
cally.  You may also submit a letter to the editor 
using the e-mail address or street address on 
Page 2.
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